Kaddaffi: Good Riddance, but ....

The killing on Thursday of Libyan strongman Kaddaffi will spread much relief around the world, and cause very little mourning. The way it happened should be a concern to a world looking to raise the level of international justice.

Making his last stand at Surt, Kaddaffi was under constant NATO surveillance, as around him blood flowed from loyalists, rebels and residents. When his entourage tried to break through the forces besieging the town, missiles fired by drones disabled his vehicles, and Kaddaffi was wounded in the ensuing firefight. His remaining forces were destroyed, and he was captured.

During the confusion immediately following his discovery in a drainage culvert, he was dragged around and shot at close range. Videos of his final moments went viral over the internet. As the day went on, world leaders appeared on news broadcasts celebrating the success of the cooperative military operation, and the end of a forty-two year dictatorship.

A few briefly noted the role played by NATO and the extrajudicial execution of the dictator, but the general euphoria prevented a more detailed examination. But these events do need to be acknowledged as historical facts, and incorporated into the popular history, in order that future interventions be initiated with the best understanding of the risks and likely outcomes under similar circumstances.

NATO was given a narrow mandate by the UN to enforce a no-fly zone, and to take action to protect civilians during the popular revolt against the Kaddaffi regime. At the time, the revolt was failing, and a terrible massacre at the hands of the brutal Kaddaffi would almost certainly have followed its collapse. Swift intervention by a true multinational force disabled Kaddaffi's ability to attack by air or land, and the revolt continued, made stronger by supplies of arms from a variety of sources. The NATO forces continued airstrikes against Kaddaffi's forces, and bombed places Kaddaffi was thought likely to be; all the time denying we were trying to kill him.

In the US, Congress reluctantly demanded an explanation for US involvement beyond the allotted time President Obama could act on an emergency basis without Congressional approval. Semantic arguments were offered, such as that drone attacks don't rise to the level of "hostilities." Since Kaddaffi was so definitely a bad guy, even in Washington's highly polarized political environment, nobody pulled the plug.

Thus were the drones ready for their role in the final conflict of the Kaddaffi era. It would be a stretch to claim the NATO forces were protecting civilians by attacking, as Kaddaffi's convoy tried to flee. The argument that air support for the rebels would shorten the conflict, and thereby lower the human cost of the rebellion is valid only if the rebels prevail, and was not offered in the calculus used to formulate NATO's UN authorization. If NATO involvement was crucial to the success of the rebellion, then it exceeded its mandate, and that will inhibit building consensus for future interventions on humanitarian grounds. For purposes of analysis, it matters not that we are all better off without Kaddaffi.

Given the strategic importance of Libyan oil, the rush by western states to recognize a transitional government, and begin diplomacy [and commerce], is understandable. But caution is indicated by the lack of discipline exhibited by rebel forces, that led to Kaddaffi's execution. Again, analysis should not be pre-empted by the deservedness of the achieved result.

If there is not a Libyan government with broad popular support, we will be no better off, in the world community, than we were with Kaddaffi. We will have to deal with a strongman who can dominate the other parties, and corruption will be business as usual.